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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DL.-\~U>XD T lPl,AH, INC., etal., 
Plaintiffs and Respond c nt .s, 
-vs.-
CAX.AJ_j lX~l.l{i\NCE COi\lPAKY, 
Defendant and Third Party 
Plaintiff, and Respondent 
and Cross Appellant. 
-vs.-
L~NDERWRITERS AT LLOYDS, 
LONDON, 
11hird Party Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Case No. 9284 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND ,CROSS 
APPEI~LANrr C1\NAL TKS1TRANCE COMPANY 
ln thi~ brief \\·e shall refer to the parties as they 
are designatPd in the brief of appellant. \V. e shalllike"\\rise 
rPfer to the page~ in the record and transcript by the 
~a 111e form of designation. 
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STAITEMENT OF FACTS 
We have no quarrPl ''rith the state1nent of facts con-
tained in appellants' brief. Ho,vever, \\·e believe that 
the following a1nplification of the facts may be of assist-
ance to the court in bringing into sharper focus the issues 
of this appeal. 
In their amended complaint, plaintiffs allege the is-
suance of a policy of physical damage insurance by Canal 
to the plaintiffs, effective April 7, 19·58. (R. 28) By its 
answer to the amended complaint, Canal admitted the 
issuance of the policy, but denied that it ''"·as in force 
and effect on June 30, 1958 (the date of the loss) (R. 31) 
and alleged, as a separate defense, that the policy \\·as 
cancelled on or about ~lay :2-!, 1958. (R. 32). At pretrial, 
the issues were defined as ( 1) \vhether Canal's policy 
\Vas in effect on the date of the los~, and ( 2) the extent of 
plaintiff's damages. (R. -!1). As noted in appellants' 
brief, Canal's position \\·as specifically stated in the pre-
trial order as follows: 
"The position of the defendant i~ that the 
policy· had been cancelled at a time prior to the 
loss by the mailing of notices of cancellation in 
accordance \\·ith the provisions of the policy." (R. 
41). 
Prior to the trial on plaintiff~' a1nended con1plaint 
the parties stipulated on the a1nount of da1uages. It \Yas 
reeognized b)· both 1)arties and the court, that the ~ingle 
issue before the court at trial, \Yas \\·hether the policy 
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had been in f'aet cancelled in aeeordance \\Tith the provi-
:-;ions of thP poliey providing for ten days written notice 
of cancellation. At the outset of the trial the following 
colloquy took place bet\veen counsel : 
--~Ill. \VILl(lKSON: I think that takes care 
of issue No. ~ in the Pretrial Order, leav~ng, as I 
read the Pretrial Order, ouly issue No. 1 in i.ssue 
at this tin~c, that being \vhether or not the insur-
ance policy in question is in force and effect on the 
date of the loss, to-wit: June 30, 1958. 
"'Do you agree with that Ray~ 
"MR. RAY CHRISTENSEN: That is rz:.qlzt. 
·~~IR. vVILKIKSON: As I understand, that 
is all ·zre have this morning." ( Tr. 3.) (E1nphasis 
ours.) 
In his opening statentent, counsel for Canal stated as 
follows: 
""I would say by way of an opening statement, 
your Honor, as I see this case, the simple issue 
here is whether cancellation notices 1rere nutiled 
to the insured, including the loss payee, in accord-
ance 'vith the cancellation clause in the policy." 
(R. 4) (Emphasis ours.) 
That the court so understood, in the initial phase of 
the trial, is indicated by his own co1n1nen t : 
~ 'T cannot see the 1naterialit~· of it. It isn't any 
proof they did or did uot JJuzil it, and that is all you 
arc interested iu." (R. -+~) (Eutphasis ours.) 
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Canal, having admitted the I~suante of the policy, 
was charged with the burden of proving cancellation as 
an affirmative defens(-•. ( T. 3). Canal undertook to 1neet 
this burden by the testintony of Steven X etolicky and 
Saundra Ring\vood Redding, both of who1n \Vere employ-
ee~ of Surplus Lines at the tin1e of the clainted cancella-
tion. Both of these witnesses testified clearly and un-
equivocally that notices of cancellation \\Tere 1nailed to 
the named insured (plaintiff Drain), to the loss I>ayee 
(plaintiff Utah Savings & Trust Company), to the in-
sured's agent Roy James, and to the Home Office of 
Canal. ( T. 32, 38, 59, 60, Ex. D-2). These were the only 
cancellation notices of any Canal policy which either wit-
ness had occasion to n1ail out during the course of his 
employu1ent \Yith Surplus Lines. (T. 31, 38, 61, 63). Canal 
acknowledged receipt of its copy of the notice. (T. 21) 
The agent James also ackno\vledged to N" etolicky that he 
had received a copy of a cancellation notice, (T. ~1, ±6) 
and also to Netolieky that the insured Drain had re-
ceived a cancellation notice. (T. 32, 33, 36). 
Prior to the tune the cancellation notices \Yere 1nailed 
out, N etolicky had had son1e difficulty \vith J an1es in 
collecing thP pre1nimns, both on the collision policy, and 
on other for1ns of insurance \Yritten by Surplus Lines 
for the Drain~. lie had 8eYeral tin1es notified J a1nes, both 
orall~T and in \\·riting, that if the pren1iun1s \Yere not 
pron1ptly paid, the phy~ieal da1nage polie)~ \\Tould be 
<·aneelled. Just prior to the time the caneellation no-
t ices \\·ere 1nailed, N etolick)T receiYed instructions from 
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Canal that it could not accept the phy~ical da1nage eov-
erage unless it also \vrote the full liability risk, and 
that therefore, ~ etolieky should cancel the polic)-. ( T. 
t;>, 3-±). ~Irs. Redding, in particular, \vas subjected to a 
rigorou~ and ~trPnuou~ <'l'o~~ exantination by counsel for 
the plaintiffs, but her testiuton)- rentained unshaken 
throughout. ( T. G2-73). l)pon this testi1nony Canal rested 
ih; case. 
Plaintiffs offered by \Va~- of rebuttal, testi1nony of 
plaintiff Drain, that he never did receive a cancellation 
notice. ( T. 7~). He ad1nitted, however, on cross exanlina-
tion that his business mail was received at his home, and 
that his \\Tife had access to the 1nail box. ( Tr. 86-87). He 
also adrnitted that he had been \varned by J a1nes that the 
policy would be cancelled if he did not produce the 1noney 
to pay the pre1niums on it. (T. 88-89). Plaintiffs also 
called ~lr. Bryan of the loss payee bank, who likewise 
testified that he did not receive cancellation notice. ( T. 
93). On cross exan1ination he testified that he opened 
H1nost" of the 1nail; that it ,,-as "'usually" delivered to his 
desk and that he "'usually" exrunined and sorted the 1nail. 
But he admitted that so1neone else could open the mail 
and that it \Yas possible for so1neone else to have opened 
the mail on the date the cancellation notice "\Vas received. 
(T. 96-97). 
Plaintiffs also called the agent Ro)~ J a1nes, \\Tho on 
direct exa1nination testified that he had received no notiee 
of cancellation nor had his eliPnt, plaintiff Drain, as far 
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as he kne\\·. Ho\\·ever, he admitted on cross-examination 
that N etolicky had several times threatened to cancel 
the policy for nonpaytnent of vretniunl. (T. 106) \\Then 
confronted with his own letter he admitted that he had 
received some kind of a \vritten notice of cancellation on 
the Drain account. (Ex. D-3, T. 108). He also admitted 
that the insured Drain had received some kind of notice. 
( T. 110). He ad1nitted that he knew the cancellation \\"a~ 
to be effective on ~fay 2-±th, and that both received can-
cellation notices. ( T. 111, 112, 123, 124). 
On this evidence the court initially found, that at 
the date of the loss on June 30, 1958, the policy \vas in 
full force and effect ~~and had not been cancelled.~, (R. 
76). On 'Canal's motion for ne'v trial, it ",.as strenuously 
argued to the court that the court's finding \Yas equi-
valent to a finding that both the "'i tnesses X etolicky and 
Redding had co1nmitted perjury at trial, "\Yhereas a find-
ing that the cancellation notices had been n1ailed 'vould 
not have the effect of finding that the "itnesses Drain 
and Bryan \\"ere guilty of perjury since they personally 
might have not reeeived the notices even if they \\,.ere 
properl~v 1nailed. See :20 ... -\_nl. J ur. 1037-1038, I~vid. § 1186. 
This argu1nent \\·as apparently persuasive on the court, 
because thereafter the court prepared an an1ended find-
ing, 1-t- (a), \VhPrein the court specifieally found that 
tlH~ testimon~· of ~fr~. Redding ,\.a8 true, and ''that she 
Ina iled thP notice of eancellation to the natned in~ured and 
to the loss payee, n as tP~tified h~,. her. (R. SG-87). 
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r pon this finding on the crucial and sole issue before 
the court, judgu1ent should have been entered in favor 
of Canal Insurance l 10llll)any and against the plaintiffs, 
no cause of aetion. lio,vever, the court, although "\villing 
to correct the findings, ,,·us un\\·illing to change the result. 
In order to acco1nplish this the court introduced into the 
case a ne\\' theory "·hich up to that time had not been 
advanced or even suggested, by the plaintiffs. It ,,·as a 
theory of estoppel, based upon testi1nony received by 
the court over objections of Canal throughout the trial, 
that after the effective date of cancellation, further pre-
mimns "·ere paid by Drain through James and were 
accepted b~· Canal's agent. The plaintiffs were permitted 
to show that following the effective date of cancellation 
(.Jlay :2-l:th), and on or about June 6th, the plaintiffs' 
agent submitted to Canal's agent a check for $181.0-t (Ex. 
P-5). This "·us to cover various obligations of Drain to 
Hurplus Lines. ( T. 99-100, Ex. P -5). A1nong other things, 
it "Tas to pa~· the preinituns on certain bonds "Thich ~,vere 
not even 'vritten b~· Canal; (Ex. P-5, T. 100) to pay past 
due installn1ents on Canal's collision policy (Ex. P-5, 
T. 99-100) and to pay the do\\·n payu1ent on a liability 
policy "\\'I~tten hy Surplus Lines in Canal for Drain, but 
never delivered to Drain. ( T. 35, 49, 99, Ex. P -5). Ad-
Inittedly a substantial portion of this check was owed to 
Surplus Lines ·Co1npany in any event, and it 'vas entitled 
to retain a substantial portion of it. .t\ec-ording to the 
testin1ony of X etolicky, it "·as all O"\\Ted to Surplus Lines. 
( T. 33). The evidenc-e also ~ho,\·ed ,,·ithout di:spute that 
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no demand wa~ ever made by Drain or J a1nes, or anyone 
on their behalf, for any portion of the funds that Surplus 
Lines \Vas not entitled to receive. (T. 91, 118). 
Up to the time of trial, no claim had ever been as-
serted by plaintiff~ of estoppel, or reinstate1nent. As \Ve 
have heretoforl~ den1onstrated, the single issue before 
the court, as recognized by counsel for all parties and 
the court, was as to whether cancellation notices had been 
mailed. \Vhile the rules provide for liberal amendments 
of the pleadings, even after trial, to conform to the proof, 
the application of this rule should be limited to proof 
properly received under the issues presented to the court, 
or to proof received \\'"ithout objections by the party 
who would be injured by it. (Rule 15 (b) ) . The proof 
of pay1nent in this case \vas objected to throughout the 
trial by Canal on the grounds that it had no relevancy 
or materiality on the issue before the court, i.e., \vhether 
cancellation noticPs \\,.ere 1nailed. That the eourt recog-
nized that it made no proof in that regard, is a1nply den1-
onstrated by the court's O\\TJl finding (l!a) that the can-
cellation notices \vere mailed. 
POIKTS TO BE "'"\RGlTED 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE POLICY 
OF INSURANCE, ISSUED BY THIS DEFENDANT. 'VAS NOT 
CANCELLED PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THE LOSS SUS-
TAINED BY THE PLAIN'TIFFS. 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING EVIDENCE, OVER 
THE OBJECTIONS OF THE DEFENDANT AND THIRD 
PARTY DEFENDANT, AS TO PAYMENTS MADE BY 
PLAINTIFFS OF PREMIUM ON THIS DEFENDAN'T'S 
POLICY AFTER THE DATE OF CANCELLATION. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CANAL IN-
SURANCE COMPANY WAS ESTOPPED TO PROVE CAN-
CELLATION. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE PLAIN-
TIFFS TO AMEND THEIR PLEADINGS AND THE PRE-
TRIAL ORDER TO SET FORTH A ·THE·ORY DIFFERENT 
FROM THE ONE ON WHICH THE CASE WAS TRIED AND 
SUBMITTED. 
POIN'T V. 
THE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS 
AND AGAINST DEFENDANT CANAL INSURANCE COM-
pANY, IS INCONSISTENT WITH, AND CONTRARY 'TO, 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, AND IS AGAINST THE EVI-
DENCE AND IS AGAINST LAW. 
POINT VI. 
IN THE EVENT THAT THE COURT FINDS THAT 
THE JUDGlVIENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS AND 
AGAINST CANAL SHOULD BE AFFIRMED, CANAL'S JUDG-
MENT OVER AGAINST LLOYDS SHOULD LIKEWISE BE 
AFFIRMED. 
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ARGU~IENT 
POINT I. 
THE COUR'T ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE POLICY 
OF INSURANCE, ISSUED BY THIS DEFENDANT, WAS NOT 
CANCELLED PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THE LOSS SUS-
TAINED BY THE PLAIN·TIFFS. 
The case of Jeusen v. T·raders & Gellerallusnrance 
Company, 345 P.:Zd 1, a very recent decision from the Su-
preme Court of California is very si1nilar on its facts to 
the case at bar. There \Yas presented to the California 
court in that case, practically the exact points as are in-
volved here. In that case defendant issued its automobile 
policy to one DiMatteo and his father as insureds. The 
policy contained a cancellation provision similar to the 
one in the case at bar. On August lOth, separate notices 
of cancellation \Yere mailed to Diniatteo and to his father 
respectively. K either notice \Yas ever returned to defend-
ant's office. However, both Di::\Iatteos testified that the 
cancellation notices were never received by them, and 
that they had no notice of any rlai1ned cancellation until 
November. Regular n1onthly pre1niun1s on the poliry 
were paid by Di~Iatteo through X ovember. DiJiatteo 
became involved in an aeeident on X ove1nber 15th. It \vas 
held b~r the Supre1ne Court of California that the can-
cellation provisions of the polir)r "rere clear and unequi-
voeal; that it \\ra~ not neee8sar~~ for the insureds actually 
to receive notiee of eancPllation in order for the cancella-
tion to be effective, and that upon proof of 1nailing of the 
<·.an<'Pllation notices, as provided b)r the policy, the e.an-
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eellation \\·as pfft~ctive at the ti1ne specified 111 the 
notice~. 
'rhe eourt carefully reviewed all of the recent author-
ities dealing \vith thP proble1n, including a reeent anno-
tation to \\rhich \\·e shall later refer. The opinion is itself 
a rather eou1 plete brief on the sufficiency of cancellation 
notices under cancellation provisions sin1ilar to those 
here involved. The court further held that the 1nere fact 
that premiutns "·ere paid after the effPe.tive date of can-
cellation, and that unearned pre1niums "·ere not returned 
to the insured, "·as not suffic-ient to vitiate the cancella-
tion. The eourt quoted from a previous trial of the same 
ease, reported in 1+1 Cal. App. 2d 162, 296 P.2d ±34, as 
follows: 
"The duty to refund is an obligation that 
springs into being when the co1npany cancels the 
policy. Delay in performing, or failure to per-
form, thiJs duty does not of itself render cancella-
tion ineffective.,_. (En1phasis our~.) 
There is an excellent annotation on the sante ques-
tion in G± A.L.R. :Zd follo\ving the report of the case of 
TV est Jnoreland v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance 
Corp., 144 Conn. 265, 129 A.~cl 623, 64 A.L.R. 2d 976. The 
annotation co1n1nences at page 985 in_A.L.R. The authori-
ties there cited are sufficient to "rarran t a reversal of 
the judgment below, and the entry of judgn1ent in favor 
of the defendant Canal Insurance Con1pany, and against 
the plaintiffs, no cause of action. 
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Although the court below amended its original find-
ings by adding #1-1 (a), wherein the court specifically 
found that cancellation notices \Vere Inailed, the court 
never deleted or 1nodified its original Finding #1-1 to the 
effect that the policy wa~ never cancelled. The said 
Findings are wholly inconsistent. Finding #1-±(a) being 
the latter Finding, must be presumed to 1nodify any prior 
Findings inconsistent with it. l~nder the doctrine of the 
authorities heretofore cited and discussed, on the basis 
of Finding #l4(a), it necessarily follo\vs that the policy 
was cancelled, and judgment should be entered against 
the plaintiffs, no cause of action. To the same effect see 
29 Am. Jur. 737-738. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING EVIDENCE, OVER 
THE OBJECTIONS OF THE DEFENDAN'T AND THIRD 
PARTY DEFENDANT, AS TO PAYMENTS MADE BY 
PLAINTIFFS OF PREMIUM ON THIS DEFENDANT'S 
POLICY AFTER THE DATE OF CANCELLATION. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE PLAIN-
TIFFS TO AMEND THEIR PLEADINGS AND THE PRE-
TRIAL ORDER TO SET FORTH A ·THEORY DIFFERENT 
FROM THE ONE ON WHICH THE CASE WAS TRIED AND 
SUBMITTED. 
In support of our Points II and 1\r \Ye fully endorse 
I>oint II of Appellant'~ brief as set forth on pages 25 to 
~8 t hPreof. In supple1nent thereof, \Ye \Yish to subn1it the 
following: 
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Fron1 the Parlie~t decision~ in this jurisdiction, es-
toppel has been considPred a~ an affir1native elaun or de-
t'en~l\ ,,·hieh is not available unless specificall~· pleaded 
and prov·ed. Poynter c. Chipnlan, 8 lTtah -1--1-:2, 3:2 P. 690 ~ 
/~11lldsen v. ()nuulsO'll, 10 {Ttah 1:2-1-,37 P. 250. 
In HoHllH~rger & Co. 0 . .JJlex.ander & Co., 11 lTtah 363, 
-1-0 P. 260, this court said : 
Hif the cause of action is based upon an es-
toppel in pais, it is necessary that the facts con-
~tituting the estoppel should be pleaded. * * * 
* * * Plai,nttff will not be permitted to recover 
upon the gro1tnd of an estoppel which is not set 
up in the pleadings. The estoppel consti.t·utes a 
disti~ct cause of action, and cannot b.e taken ad-
vantage of, either as a gro·u nd of recovery or a 
defense, ·un1e~i.,·s pleaded. The object of the declara-
tiJon is to gt"ve the defendant fair notice of tlze 
ca8e he is called into court to nteet. A count 
charging hin1 \\"i th the acceptance of a bill of ex-
change cannot be held to infor1n him that he will 
be called upon to Ineet a liability on the ground 
of estoppel.' " ( Eu1phasis ours.) 
In ReyHolds 0. Pasco, ~-1- Utah ~19, G6 P. 1064, this 
court said: 
"In the present case no estoppel \Yas pleaded. 
Therefore that question cannot be raised in this 
case. 8 Enc. Pl. & Prac. pp. 8, 9." 
See also Berow ·0·. Shields, 48 l~tah :270, 159 P. 538; 
Evona lnv. Co. v. Brummitt, 166 Utah 82, 240 P. 113; 
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Barber v. Anderson, 73 lJtah 357, 27-! P. 136; Cantpbell v. 
Nunn, 78 Utah 316, 2 P.2d 899, and Pay.son Bldg. & Loan 
Soc. v. Taylor, 87 Utah 302, 48 P.2d 894. 
The rule is incorporated in our present rules of 
civil procedure, Rule 8( c), U. R. C. P. As \\·e have here-
tofore pointed out in sorne detail in our statement of 
facts, not only did plaintiffs never plead estoppel, but 
they never asserted it at any other phase of the proceed-
ings. No such claims "·ere advanced at pretrial or at 
trial, or even at the time of argument on defendant's 
1notion for new trial. Indeed the doctrine of estoppel \Yas 
not introduced by the plaintiffs at all, but by the trial 
judge, and then only after argument on the motion for 
new trial, and after there \Yas no opportunity on the part 
of ·Canal to meet the supposed issue. 
While Rule 15 (b) permits amend1nents to confonn 
to the evidence, ",.here issues are tried by expre~s or inz-
pl~ed consent of the partiesJ that rule has no application 
here. The court's finding of estoppel is apparently based 
upon the evidence that pny1nents \\·ere received by Canal's 
agent after the effectiYe date of cancellation. Ho\vever, 
such evidenee \\·as consistently objected to by counsel for 
Canal throughout the trial. It "·as never received by 
Pither Pxpress or in1plied consent. This ease apears to fall 
squarely ". i thin the prinei ples enuneia ted by this court 
in the ease of Taylor c. E. JI. Royle Corp., (l~tah)~ :2G-± 
1_). 2d 27D, and "f...,.atioua111 larJners lTJn~on Prop·erfy & Cas-
ualty (}o. v. Tlunnpsou, ( l Ttah), 28G P.2d 249, both of 
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,,·hich are quoted in appellants, brief. .l\s said b~,. thi~ 
court in thP reeent case of Buelz ner Block Co. u. Gle.zos, 
(Utah), :~10 P.2d 517,519: 
HRule 16(b) and Rule 5-!(c) ... provide in 
es:-;Pn<'P that (1VPn though issues are not raised 
h~· the pleadings, if the~· are tried by expres.s or 
inlplied consent of the ZHtrties, a final judgment 
can be rendered on such issues. But, as this court 
has held on prior oeeas ions, t lz e ad ner se party 
should be ,qicen the benefit of every doubt. He 
utust not have been ntisled nor in any vvay preju-
diced by the introduction of the new issues." 
(Emphasis ours.) 
It follovvs therefore that the court erred in receiving 
evidence of pay1nents over objections of (_~anal and that 
the eourt like,vise erred in per1nitting plaintiffs to amend 
their pleadings and the pretrial order to introduce an 
entirel~· ne\\· theor~·, after the ease had been tried and a 
n1otion for new trial had been argued. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CANAL IN-
SURANCE COMPANY WAS ES'TOPPED TO PROVE CAN-
CELLATION. 
Even if it be conceded that the evidence of payutent 
\\·as properl~· received by the court, and that the claim 
of estoppel "Tas before the court, the evidence wholly 
fails to sustain the finding of estoppel. The elements of 
estoppel are set forth in 19 Am. J ur. couunencing at page 
()-!-:~.Basically they are these: (1) Condn('t "Thieh autounts 
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to a false representation or conceahnent of rnaterial facts, 
or which is calculated to convey the irnpression that the 
facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with those 
which the party subsequently atteu1pts to assert; ( 2) in-
tention or at least expectation that such conduct shall be 
acted upon by the other party, and ( 3) kno\\·ledge, actual 
or constructive, of the real facts. It is further held that 
estoppels must be certain to every intent, and are not 
to be taken or sustained by mere argu1nent or doubtful 
inferences. 
The acts, clairns or conduct relied on to estop must 
be plainly inconsistent with the right afterward set up. 
19 A.m. J ur., Estoppel, Sec. 43. One cannot be estopped 
by reason of accepting that which he is legally entitled 
to receive, 19 A.m. J ur., Estoppel, Sec. 65. The proof must 
be clear, precise and unequivocal. Mere conjecture 1s 
insufficient. 19 A.m. J ur. 852, Estoppel, Sec. 199. 
The foregoing principles \Yere recognized by this 
court in the case of Peterson v. Ogden CiJty, (l~tah), 116 
P.~d 599, \Yhere it \\·as held that Ogden City "·as not 
estopped from attacking a tax deed because the city 
received frorn the county its proportion of the money 
obtained fro1n the plaintiff at the tax sale. 
We have been unable to find any similar case where 
it has ever been contended that a policy of insurance once 
cancelled, can be revivPd by the silnple expedient of 
H(~nding in a pre1niuin payn1ent. Son1e,vhat analogous 
is tht~ l\1arYland case of Busb11 l;. The ~'orth .. A.n1erican 
. ~ 
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l_)t}e 1 Jl.-.,·. ()o._. -±0 ~ld. ;)7:2, 17 Aut. l~ep. G3-!. In that case 
it \ra~ held that thP insurer's agent could not by receiving 
an ovPrdue preutiuut, revive the policy after it had lapsed. 
lt \ra~ further held that the receipt and retention of 
1none~· h~· the co1upa11.Y \\·as not a ratification of the 
agPnCs aet~ \\·ithout proof that the ro111pany acted \\·ith 
kno\vledge of the fact~. The court quoted with approval 
from Bouton v. The Anterican Mutual Life Ius. Co. as 
follows: 
H "\V·e think that he (the agent), \Vas not eln-
powered to receive any pre1niuu1 \vhich \vas not 
paid according to the require1nents of the policy, 
that is in advance. That instrun1ent \vas his sole 
guide in regard to \\·hat he should do under it. 
The contract \vas to be 1nade by the defendants, 
and not by hi1n, excepting in the capacity of their 
agent; he was not authorized to alter or vary it, 
or depart in any respect fron1 it, or dispense \vith 
the fulfillment of its conditions by the insured, 
or discharge it, or revive it after it had h~T its 
terms ceased to be obligatory on his principal, hy 
a waiver of co1npliance \\·ith its provisions or 
otherwise. These must be done hy thP partiE·s to 
the contract. He was only authorized to act in 
pursuance of it, and then so far only as it gave 
him authority. He could exercise only the power 
delegated to hi1n to depart from the tern1s of the 
policy.' '' 
See also the recent case of Janze~ u. United States 
of Anzerioa, 185 F.2d 113, \vhere the court said: 
"For another reason, insured's polic~· was not 
reinstated by estoppel. \Vaiver or esfO]JJJel 1rill 
not operate to reinstate a policy u Hless the ill-
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sured has performed the necessary conditions pre-
cedent and has perfected his application." (Eln-
phasis ours.) 
There is no sho\\'ing here that plaintiff ever applied 
for reinstatement. 
The basic elements of an estoppel have not been made 
out. The acceptance by Canal's agent of the check for 
the premium cannot be said to be an unequivocal repre-
sentation or connnitment that the policy \Yas still in ef-
fect. On the contrary, the evidence is "rithout dispute 
that there was a balance owed by the insureds not only 
on the policy here involved, but also on other policies, 
including the policies \Yritten by Canal, and policies writ-
ten by other companies for \Yhich Surplus Lines \Yas also 
an agent. The Surplu~ Lines manager testified that the 
entire amount of the check \Yas insufficient to bring the 
account current. Therefore, in accepting the check, Sur-
plus Lines accepted it under a claim of right for past due 
obligation~. The acceptance of this check and the reten-
tion of the proceeds thereof for a period of less than a 
month before the aceident, is certainly not clear and un-
equivocal proof of a representation by Canal's agent that 
the policy \vas still in effect. 
Neither is tht)re any sho\ving of intention or expecta-
tion that Canal'~ aeeeptanee of the check \Vould be relied 
upon hy the other party, as indicating \Yillingness to c.on-
tinue to carrY thP ri~lc On the contrarv~ X etolickY testi-
. . . 
fied that hP explained to plaintiffs~ agent that Canal, 
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undPr it:-; 0\\'11 under"Triting rules, could not continuP to 
('HIT~· the risk an~·,,·ay, ~intP plaintiffs \\·erP un,villing 
to 'vrite all their lial)ilit~· insuranee "Tith Canal. 
XPither is there an~· proof that (;anal had kno\vledge 
of facts dift'<~rent f'ron1 those 'vhieh their agent expressly 
or by intplication represented. \rie,ving the evidence in 
the light 1uost favorable to the plaintiffs, it cannot he 
said that an~r of the eleinents of estoppel have been n1ade 
out. 
POIN'T V. 
THE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS 
AND AGAINST DEFENDANT CANAL INSURANCE COM-
pANY, IS INCONSISTENT WITH, AND CONTRARY 'TO, 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, AND IS AGAINST THE EVI-
DENCE AND IS AGAINST LAW. 
In support of our Point V 've fully endorse the argu-
lnent advanced hy appellant under its Point I, as set forth 
at pages 18 to 2-1 of its brief. \\r e also refer to the argu-
luent '"hich ''"·e have advanced under Point I and Point II . 
.. A .. ny further argun1ent at this point 'vould be purely 
repetitious. 
POINT VI. 
IN THE EVENT THAT THE COURT FINDS THAT 
THE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS AND 
AGAINST CANAL SHOULD BE AFFIRMED, CANAL'S JUDG-
MENT OVER AGAINST LLOYDS SHOULD LIKEWISE BE 
AFFIRMED. 
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In the event that the court finds in our favor on the 
preceding points, Point \TI will become moot and it will 
be unnecessary to consider it. lfo"rever, in the event that 
the court finds adversely to the position of Canal with 
. respect to the claims of plaintiffs, it will be necessary 
for the court to consider this point, wherein ·w·e answer 
appellants' Point III. 
The case bet\\·een Canal and Lloyds \\Ta~ submitted 
to the court on a written stipulation of facts \vhich is 
set forth in Appellants' brief, commencing on Page 11. 
It may be noted that on and prior to April 8, 1958, the 
Benson Company \vas the representative of both Canal 
and Lloyds, \vith authority to \\Trite policies of insurance 
on behalf of both of them. Both the Canal policy and 
Lloyds Certificate of reinsurance \vere written by the 
Benson Company as representative of each. Benson 
Company continued as representative of Lloyds up to 
the time of the claimed cancellation on both policies of 
insurance. Ho\vever, after April Sth, H. F. Benson, Jr., 
was ·Canal' agent. He had an oral understanding \vith 
l~anal that he \vould keep reinsured in Lloyds all physical 
damage insurance \rritten in Canal to the extent of not 
less than 7570 of the entire risk. See stipulated Facts 
~ o. 3 to No. 5 inclusive. 
At about the ~~une ti1ue that the notices of cancella-
tion on the Canal polic~T \Yere 1nailed out, a paper de-
norninated a General Change Endonse1nent to the Lloyds 
(~ertifien:tP of R.ein~urance \YH~ 1nailed to ( 1anal. The 
0Pneral l~hange Endorse1nent rl)eited as follo\\TS: ''In 
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eon~ i dP ration of a ret urn pre nil u1n of $-±18.08 and $4.18 
reinsurance tax, this certificate tenninated in conjullcfioll 
w i lli ovPrla ~· ing Canal poli ey." (Emphasis ours.) 
1 t \\·ill be notLld that thP General Uhange 1£ndorse-
Inent \Va~ signed on behalf of Lloyds by H. F. Benson, 
Jr., Canal'~ O\\'n agent. The single i~~ue presented to the 
court on the third party co1nplaint against Lloycls i~ 
\vhether the G-eneral L~hange Endor~en1ent \vas suffi-
cient to acco1nplish a cancellation or termination of 
Lloyds reinsurance eertificate to Canal, if the Canal 
policy had not been effectively cancelled. 
It is interesting to note that although the Lloyds' 
certificate provided for cancellation by ten days' written 
notice of cancellation, the usual forn1 of cancellation 
notice \vas not sent out. Instead, the agent used a ""gen-
eral change endorsentent" which in and of itself tends to 
create so1ne a1nbiguity a~ to the intent. It is the conten-
tion of Canal that the general change endorsement did 
not, and could not, effect a cancellation of the reinsurance 
certificate, unless the (~anal policy was also cancelled. By 
the express language of the endorse1nent, the certificate 
is tenninated ··in conj nnctio n \vith overlaying (ianal 
policy." The phrase ·~in conjunction with," Ineans "in 
association \Yith,'' or ""occurring together," or ·"concur-
rence or contbination of events.'' See Black'~ La\v Diction-
ary, 3rd Ed. page 230; Blaisdell v. InllaiJitants of Town 
of York, 110 ~[e. 500, 87 A. 361 and \Y ebster's X e\v Inter-
national Dictionary, page 474. 
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By the express language of the general change en-
dorsement it was to take effect "in conjunction \vith," 
or "in association with" the ·Canal policy. lt follows there-
fore, that if the Canal policy \\Tas not cancelled, the 
Lloyd's certificate \vas not rancelled. That the intent 
was to cancel the reinsurance only in conjunction 
with i.e. simultaneously with, the ·Canal policy is 1nore 
1nanifest, when it is viewed in light of the agent's 
understanding \Yith Canal that it would reinsure, and 
keep reinsured, all physical damage risks, to the extent 
of not less than 75r0 of the amount of insurance. It must 
also be borne in mind that Canal's Agent, H. F. Benson, 
Jr., signed the General Change Endorsement on behalf of 
Lloyds. In vie\v of his oral understanding \vith Canal, 
and in the absence of any showing of motive or reason 
for doing so, it is inconceivable that he would have \vanted 
to, or attempted to cancel the reinsurance certificate, 
except ''in conjunction \vith the overlaying ·Canal policy." 
It is further to be noted, that the ter1nination is, by 
its language, in consideration of a return pre1niun1 of 
$418.08 and $4.18 reinsurance tax. There is no evidence 
that the return pre1niun1 \vas ever offered or tendered to 
Canal, or received or accepted by it. 'Vhile it is true 
that, under the language of the Lloyds certificate, the 
tender of the unearned prenuum \\Tas not necessary to 
effect cancellation, if unequivocal cancellation notiee8 
were 1nailed, such \va_s not the case here. Here the repre-
sentative of Llo~Tds 1nadP the return of unearned prenlimn 
thr eon~ideration for trr1nination of the reinsurance 
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('Prtil'ie(ttP, and sin(•p there \\'a~ a failure of considera-
tion, thP elain1ed ter1nination b~· the general change en-
dor~Plnent is like,,·i~e invalid on that ground. 
11:vl~n if it ean Le f'airl~· argued that the language of 
the g(·neral ehange endor~e1nent was ~usceptible to 1nore 
than one interpretation, such does not aid Lloyds. lt is 
\vell settled that cancellation is an affir1native defense, 
and the party asserting it has the burden of proof. Trans-
.Antericn Ins. Co. u. Wilson, 263 Ala. G::t~, 80 So. 2d 253. 
It i~ equally \rell settled that a cancellation notice, to be 
effective, must be clear, unconditional and unequivocal, 
and that any a1nbiguities in it will be resolved in favor 
of the insured, and against the insurer. In 6 Couch Cyclo-
pedia of Insurance La,v, Sec. 1-±-±2, page 5098, it is said: 
"'Provisions for cancellation in an insurance 
polic~· 1nust bP strictly follo\ved to effect that re-
sult. .. The principle that underlies the decisions 
is that a party is precluded fron1 destroying the 
existing contract rights except upon a strict ob-
servance of the reservations contained in the con-
tract itself, or so1ne statute, or by agreement with, 
or \\Taiver of his rights hy, the other party. But 
in the absence of \\'aiver or estoppel it is generally 
agreed that a uotice of caucel!atiou to the insnred 
uutst be clear, uHconditional and unequivocal, and 
that a 1nere expression of a purpose or intention 
to cancel in the future is not sufficient; that is, 
it must be one of actual eaneellation, not of future 
conditional cancellation, or of doubtful ;neanio.rJ 
as to tin~e or purpose ... ( E1nphasis ours.) 
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The same author says at page 5100: 
"Furthermore, notice to cancel, must be an 
actual one within the terms and meaning of the 
policy, it not being sufficient to state merely an 
intent to cancel upon compliance or noncompli-
ance, as the case rnay be, 'vith sorne condition; 
it must so unequivocally inform insured as to 
leave no doubt on his part that his poliey "~in ex-
pire at the end of the period limited within the 
terms of the policy, and that insurer's liability 
under the contract will then cease." (En1phasis 
ours). 
See also ·§ 1406, p. 5021. 
In 29 Am. J ur., 733, Insurance, Sec. 383, it is said: 
"Generally speaking, a strict con1pliance 'Yith 
a policy provision for notice is essential to effect a 
cancellation by such a notice and a nzb·igu ities iu 
the noti'ce will be resolre.d in favor of the ivn-
sured." (Emphasis ours.) 
See also § 379, pp. 730-731. 
In \ .. olume 6, .L\ppleman, Insurance Law and Prac-
tice, Sec. 4185, page 722, it is said: 
''Such notice rnust be Pxpressed in positrre, 
clear and unequivocal tern1.s. A notice must be 
in accordanee "·ith the poliey provi~ions. and n1ust 
be explieit~ pcrcnzpfory. and unconditional, so that 
the in~urPd "·ill not be left in doubt a~ to the ex-
piration date of thP polie~~.'~ (J~n1phasis ours.) 
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~\nd in Lindy c. Lititz "Afutual In~. l 1o., 232 S.C. 1, 
100 SE2d 3-l-t, the court said: 
'· \ Vhile notiee of cancellation need not be in 
an~· particular for1n, it 111ust be of ~ueh character 
a~ to positi,z;cl.IJ an.d uueqn£vocally incU~cale to the 
in.",.ttred that the CoJJlJHlll.lJ doe~ not intend longer 
to be bound by the contract . ... Any ambiguity in 
the uoticc 'ln1tst be resolved in favor of the ..:1s-
s~tred.'' (Emphasis ours.) 
~ee also Cluunvers v. Washington J.Vat. Ins. Co., (Ga. 
App.), 17 SE2d 899, and Medford v. Pacific National Fire 
Tns. Co., (Ore.), 219 P. (2d) 142. 
Although we have attempted to make a diligent re-
search of the subject, \Ve have been tmable to locate any 
case closely similar in fact to the case at bar. IIowever, 
upon the general principles above set forth, a determina-
tion in favor of ·Canal, on this point, is required. By the 
express language of the general change endorse1nent the 
ter1nination \\ras to beco1ne effective only ''in conjunction 
\vith," or association \\ri.th the termination of the Canal 
policy. If the Canal policy \Yas not cancelled, it follows 
that the Lloyds reinsurance certificate \\ras not cancelled. 
Even if there are so1ne ambiguities in the 1natter, they 
1nust be resolved in favor of the insured, which in this 
instance, is Canal, and against the insurer (Lloyds). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court unequivocally found that cancellation 
notices on the Canal policy \Yere mailed to the plaintiff~ 
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1n accordance with the cancellation proVIsions of the 
policy. It necessarily follo,vs therefor, that the policy 
was cancelled prior to the date of loss and Canal has no 
liabililty to the plaintiffs, or any of them, for the damage 
to their truck. Estoppel was not plead or otherwise as-
serted by plaintiffs and any evidence received in support 
thereof 'vas improperly received; and the evidence before 
the court was 'vholly insufficient to raise an estoppel 
against Canal to assert the cancellation of the policy. 
Canal is entitled to have judgment rendered in its favor 
and against plaintiffs, no cause of action, or at the very 
least, a new trial, to meet the issue of estoppel raised in 
the court below for the first time after argument on Ino-
tion for new trial. If it is determined that Canal's policy 
was not effectively cancelled, it necessarily follo,vs that 
the Lloyds certificate of reinsurance was not cancelled 
and Canal's judgment against Lloyds should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
.JIORETOK~ CHRISTENSEN & 
CHRISTENSEN 
By: RAY R. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for defendant and 
respondent and cross appellant 
Canal Insurance Company 
1205 ·Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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